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Abstract
Purpose – Special and differential treatment (SDT) in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has failed to
integrate developing countries into the international trading system, as contemplated by the WTO
Agreement, itself. This paper aims to interrogate the current application of SDT by WTO members as the
possible undermining factor for SDT not delivering on its objective.
Design/methodology/approach – The research uses a qualitative legal methodology. This study
conducts desk analysis of primary legal materials and existing literature to assess current reflections of SDT
and draw lessons for reforms in theWTO.
Findings – From interrogating current SDT practice in the WTO and a comparative analysis with a similar
differential treatment under the Montreal Protocol, this paper finds that indeed, the problem lies in the current
approach to SDT application in the WTO. This study finds that the existing absence of eligibility criteria for
determining access to SDTby countries is the core reason for the abuse and sub-optimal outcome from its application.
Originality/value – While making a case for a rules-based approach to differentiation in the WTO, this
paper proposes a unique methodology for differentiating between developing countries for SDT, including the
use of a composite indicator to ensure that indicators that are used sufficiently reflect their heterogeneous
needs. Drawing inspiration from Gonzalez et al. (2011a), this study introduces an adaptation for selecting a
threshold for graduation. Specifically, the proposal on the value of the standard deviation of countries from
the weighted mean of the composite indicator as the threshold for graduating countries from SDT is novel.
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1. Introduction
The use of special and differential treatment (SDT) in theWorld Trade Organisation (WTO)
has attracted a great deal of academic attention and it is widely debated whether SDT is a
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development tool (aimed at addressing the problems of developing countries) or a trade tool
(to support the integration of developing countries into the trading system) (Lee, 2016; Page,
2004; Conconi and Perroni, 2015; Hoekman, 2005; Ornelas, 2016; Surono and Hidayati, 2019).
Furthermore, the accessibility of SDT by members at different levels of development is long
overdue for reconsideration. Our paper aims to critique the current framework for SDT,
review extant literature and propose an alternative framework for determining eligibility for
and content of SDT.
Traditionally, SDT was designed to help developing countries to develop their
economies through exports and to enable them to pursue policy options that they
considered appropriate for development [1] (Kleen and Page, 2005; Ornelas, 2016).
Discussions have, however, continued to rage in the academic and policy domains on how
best to streamline SDT to align with developing countries’ national economic
development strategies and invariably, better respond to their development needs
(Prowse, 2002; Hoekman et al., 2004; Hoekman et al., 2003; Cottier, 2006; Keck and Low,
2004). The focus has since changed and the justification for SDT is now to support
developing countries to overcome problems faced in implementing trade commitments
(Page, 2004; Keck and Low, 2004; Imboden, 2017). Furthermore, there is growing dissent
against the “one size fits all” principle of SDT, including calls to introduce a higher level
of differentiation between developing countries (Hoekman et al., 2003; Finger, 1991). The
objection has been underscored by former US Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick and
former EU Commissioner for External Trade, Peter Mandelson [2]. They both expressed
concerns on the need to ensure the “right degree of differentiation” for a robust SDT
regime that addresses the needs of developing countries in the WTO. The Trump
administration has explicitly sought changes to the flexibilities provided and has claimed
that SDT reflects an outdated dichotomy between developed and developing countries,
such that the need for countries to “self-declare” their developing country status amplifies
the problem (USG, 2019; WTO, 2019a). While there is a lack of support for SDT as a
growth-promoting strategy, there is also an emerging need for further research that
explicitly tackles the challenges that it presents. Past WTO Rounds, inextricably linked
SDT negotiations to introducing differentiation between developing countries,
suggesting that an ambitious SDT regime can be achieved as a trade-off for
differentiation amongst beneficiaries. While developing countries on their part made no
pretext about the rejection of the principle of differentiation [3], SDT continues to be
couched in a vague and faded language without specific objectives and measures
(Paugam and Novel, 2005). In effect, SDT talks at the multilateral level have remained
deadlocked for over two decades [4]. Within the current context, an important question is
whether the rules of the multilateral trading system, as currently framed, sufficiently
promote development. If not, how best can the current rules be redesigned to achieve the
development objectives?
The paper discusses the current SDT framework at the WTO, examines options and
suggests how the WTO could promote development by allowing targeted SDT. In
particular, the paper examines whether the existing rules-based approach to
differentiation in the WTO can serve as a blueprint for an effective and development-
oriented application of SDT. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews
underlying factors that determine SDT eligibility at the multilateral level. Section 3
outlines the case for differentiation in the WTO. Section 4 reviews alternative theoretical





2. Issues with special and differential treatment
2.1 Application of rules
The preamble of the WTO underscores the economic development of developing countries
as a major objective and encourages “positive efforts” by developed country members to
actualise it [5]. WTO agreements also reflect the underlying intent of SDT and policies to
support the development and integration of developing countries into the global trading
system. SDT provisions specifically aim to enhance trading opportunities for developing
countries, protect their interests and allow flexibility in taking on new trade obligations, as
well as in the use of trade policy instruments (Lee, 2016). It has been opined by experts that
other than merely reflecting developmental aspirations, WTO disciplines generally fall short
of advancing the interests of developing countries in real terms. For instance, while export
subsidies (an important policy tool for many developing countries) are prohibited by WTO
rules, farm support to agricultural produce by developed countries is not (Lee, 2016, p. 451).
Historically, countries such as the UK and the USA permitted the use of special treatment by
countries to enable the development of specific sectors. Both countries allowed the use of
export subsidies in the 18th and 19th centuries by their former colonies to develop their
textile industry and the rail sector, respectively, but developing countries are denied this
under the current SDT framework (Lee, 2016, p. 451; Chang, 2002). Similarly, trade-related
investment measures (TRIMs) such as local content requirements, (also, an important policy
tool used by many developing countries to increase local inputs in production processes) are
prohibited by WTO rules [6]. Evidence also suggests that several developed WTO member
countries have used similar investment measures and protectionist policies such as import
substitution and high tariffs, to support their industrial development. (Shafaeddin, 1998).
Given that the benefits of preferential schemes are being increasingly eroded, developing
countries have also questioned the economic value of traditional SDT. Lower tariffs, which
are a result of WTO negotiations, have resulted in the loss of benefits granted to developing
countries and LDCs (Francois, 2006). This has exposed the LDCs in particular, to
competition from highly efficient developed country competitors and also provided them
with far less competitive market access conditions for their key exports. On the part of
developed countries, there has been a clear change in attitude to SDT. While developed
countries continue to recognise the specific needs of LDCs, they are less willing to accord
SDT to emerging economies, which have become major trading powers over time [7]. Indeed,
the increasing share of developing countries such as Mexico and Turkey, in global trade
questions the basis and legitimacy of SDT. This is given that exports from developing
countries represent nearly 50% of all global exports, with the largest 15 developing
countries accounting for about three-fourths of those exports (UNCTAD, 2019). All these
issues underscore the rationale to seek to secure convergence amongst WTO members on
acceptable criteria for reviewing the current SDT framework.
2.2 The definition of “developing country”
The present categorisation of developing countries at the WTO applies to a wide range of
countries that, in reality, are disparate in terms of their level of development. The category of
LDCs, created by the UN in 1971 and adopted by theWTO, is the only formal categorisation
reflecting the least developed amongst the developing countries [8]. Under the Enabling
Clause deeper flexibilities such as longer transition periods to implement disciplines and
deeper preferences in the context of preferential trade programmes, are accorded to the
LDCs [9].
The concept of “developing countries” can be traced to the provision of GATT where





and use trade restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes. Articles XXXVI, XXXVII and
XXXVIII of GATT 1994 subsequently recognised the special needs of developing countries
and exempted them frommaking reciprocal concessions during trade negotiations.
Article XVIII(1) provides that:
[t]he contracting parties recognise that the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement will be
facilitated by the progressive development of their economies, particularly of those contracting
parties the economies of which can only support low standards of living and are in the early
stages of development.
Paragraph 4(a) of the Article explains its purpose as being to allow a contracting party,
whose economy “can only support low standards of living and is in the early stages of
development”, to be free to deviate temporarily from the provisions of the other Articles of
the GATT under prior defined circumstances. This is, perhaps, the closest that the GATT/
WTO system has come to defining “developing countries” (Cui, 2008, p. 133). Reading
Paragraphs 1 and 4(a) of Article XVIII together, Cui, 2008 highlights the two criteria to
support the identification of a developing country. The first is “low standard of living” and
the second is “in the early stage of development”. Cue, however, raises questions on how low
the standards of living should be and at what stage of development can a country qualify to
be in an “early stage of development” (Cui, 2008, p. 134). Annex I to the GATT provides an
insight in respect of both criteria. By “low standards of living”, it urges members to consider
the normal position of that economy rather than the exceptional circumstances such as those
that may result from the temporary existence of exceptionally favourable conditions. In the
case of “early stage of development”, Annex I explains that the phrase is not meant to apply
only to contracting parties that have just started on the process of economic development,
but applies to contracting parties whose economies are undergoing industrialisation to
reduce their dependence on primary products’ production [10].
The explanation in Annex I on how to identify a developing country, however, falls short
of establishing any objective criteria to guide an attempt to draw up a list of “developing
countries”. The language used in attempting a definition lacks any legal precision and is, at
best, a guide in which the phrases of “low standards of living” and “in the early stage of
development” should be interpreted. Citing Ceylon-Article XVIII Applications [11], Cui (2008)
illustrates the arbitrariness that underlies such criteria in defining “developing countries”. In
this case, Ceylon had applied to the GATT Working Party under Article XVIII to seek
exemption for a period of 10 years to impose quantitative restrictions on the importation of
specified petroleum products if at any time this should prove necessary to ensure the
development and operation of the domestic, petroleum refinery. In examining Ceylon’s
application, the GATT Panel had to first consider whether Ceylon was eligible under
paragraph 4(a) of Article XVIII. Going by the criteria of “low standards of living”, the Panel
found that the gross national product (GNP) per capita for Ceylon in 1955 was US$128. This
was higher than the GNP per capita of countries such as Burma and India, but lower than
that of Greece, Cuba and the Dominican Republic and very substantially lower than the GNP
per capita of industrialised countries in Western Europe. To examine the criteria and decide
whether Ceylon was “in the early stage of development”, the Panel based its consideration on
the share of manufacturing, mining and construction in the country’s GNP. This share
(including mining, a primary industry) was found to be about 10%, a figure lower than that
of Burma and Greece and substantially lower than that of developed industrial countries [12].
Cui (2008) considers the Panel’s preference for GNP per capita over the gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita or other national income indicators, in the determination of both




that the Panel provided no reasons for the preference (Cui, 2008, p. 135). Cui (2008, p. 135)
made the same point in respect to the Panel’s inclusion of mining in the calculation of the
share of certain industries relative to the GNP. He opines that albeit, the Panel’s choice was
seemingly arbitrary it was justified because there was no provision in GATTArticle XVIII to
govern such issues. Nevertheless, the use of socioeconomic indicators to categorise countries
by their level of economic development is widespread. TheWorld Bank and the Organisation
of Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD) use economic criteria such as GNP per
capita; vulnerability index; social criteria such as human development indexes and
institutional criteria such as governance and freedom index. However, these indicators
generally fail to specifically address trade-related concerns of developing countries. Also, the
very fact that they seek to measure broad development issues for which the WTO has no
mandate makes them unsuited for theWTO (Paugam and Novel, 2005, p. 11).
2.3 Self-designation for qualification
Self-designation is a means for developing countries to qualify for SDT at theWTO. Rolland
(2012) acknowledges that WTO members self-designate in a bid to secure the benefits of
various SDT provisions (Rolland, 2012). She, however, notes that the claim is not consistent
with reality. In reality, while individual countries are at liberty to self-designate, such self-
designation is subject to scrutiny by other WTO members (Rolland, 2012; Verdirame, 1996).
Any member that challenges a claim by another to developing country status bears the
burden of disproving the claim as opposed to any expectation on the claimant to prove its
claim (Cui, 2008, p. 139). Nevertheless, accepted practice suggests that the self-designating
country/claimant may bear the burden of demonstrating that it meets the requirements to
benefit from the SDT [13].
Implicit in the practice of self-designation is that a country at a different level of
development can claim the status of a developing country and, once claimed, that country is
entitled to SDT, irrespective of its capacity or level of development. The problem with such
an across-the-board approach is that it fails to respond to actual development needs and in
some cases even creates unfair competition between developing countries for trade
opportunities. For instance, a small country, like Gambia with a GDP per capita as low as
US$528.79 in 2014 has to compete with a large developing country like Mexico with a GDP
per capita of almost US$10,000 in 2015. Of course, Gambia is already prejudiced from the
onset, in terms of the level of its resources and capacity and does not stand a chance to
favourably compete with Mexico. This underscores the point that the WTO must ensure a
level playing field, not just between developed and developing countries, but also between
developing countries.
3. The legal case for “differentiation” between beneficiaries
Rolland (2012) notes that the continued absence of specific criteria for determining whether a
country qualifies as “developing” or not, has seen countries with significant differences, e.g.
in size, population, economic and trade capacities, geographical and political conditions,
which include Chile, Brazil, India and Korea, being treated as developing countries in WTO
jurisprudence (Rolland, 2012, p. 80). Such factual discrepancy between legal uniformity and
economic diversity underscores the need to achieve a balance in the application of trade
rules for countries at theWTO. In this context, the principle of differentiation is rooted in the
need to treat similarly situated developing countries similarly [14]. Differentiation was
introduced to reduce the political and economic conundrum associated with claims for





claimed by developing countries on a needs-basis and without undermining the gains from
reciprocal concessions, to developing countries as a whole (Rolland, 2012, p. 159).
The use of “special” and “differential” at the WTO supports the view that differential
treatment is intrinsic to the SDT framework. Given developing countries are at different
levels of development and with varying needs a “one size fits all” approach cannot address
the divergent needs of this group of countries. It is, thus, not surprising that the WTO
Appellate Body, in the EC-Tariff Preference case [15], held that “the needs of developing
countries vary over time” and that differentiation between countries is allowed to respond to
their different development, financial and trade needs [16]. The Appellate Body not only
gave judicial backing to the principle of differentiation but also set out the conditions
authorising the application of differentiation between developing countries in preferential
trade regimes. The Appellate Body ruled that in granting differential tariff treatment,
preference-granting countries are required by virtue of the term “non-discriminatory”, to
ensure that identical treatment is available to all similarly situated beneficiaries of a
generalised scheme of preferences (GSP). In other words, all GSP beneficiaries with the same
“development, financial and trade needs” are entitled to the same treatment that a particular
GSP scheme offers in response to such needs. The term “non-discriminatory” does not
prohibit developed countries from granting different tariffs to products originating in
different GSP beneficiaries, provided that such differential tariff treatment meets the
remaining conditions in the Enabling Clause [17]. The “similarly situated” approach
advocated by the Appellate Body provides legal support to initiatives that propose
differentiating between developing countries for purposes of according SDT only to those
that actually need it.
Drawing from the WTO panel in theUS-Copyright case [18], the word “special” connotes
“having an individual or limited application or purpose”[19]. Within the context of SDT, it
can be implied to suggests that for a treatment to be considered special, it must apply to a
particular country or case based on objective facts or conditions that are peculiar to that
individual or case. In other words, a treatment that is made available to cases simply on the
basis that they fall within a broad and subjectively defined category such as the category of
developing countries in the WTO, cannot be said to be special. From this, it would appear
that the distinction between differential treatment and “special” treatment lies in the focus of
each term [20]. While the focus of the former is on different categories, that is, by allowing
special treatment to distinguish between one category and another, the latter focusses on the
peculiarities of an individual or a case. Where “categories” exist, special treatment will not
simply apply broadly to all members of a category. It looks into the “category” to identify
meritorious and deserving individual cases based on objective facts or conditions. So, while
it may be the case that all countries of a particular category are categorised based on a
common (and often broad) differentiating factor, it cannot be the case that all WTO
members of such particular category are entitled to the same special treatment simply on the
basis that they are included in the same category. Nevertheless, this can indeed be the case if
all countries in a given category exhibit the same unique characteristics that warrant the
same special treatment.
Important differences exist between “special” and “differential” treatment, despite being
used relatedly at theWTO. This precipitates the debate on the need to link the two words ––
“special” and “differential” – in the WTO. Paugam and Novel (2005, p. 4) opine that a
scrutiny of the rationales for countries’ resort to the usage of the Enabling Clause offers
some insight into the differences. On the one hand, the Enabling Clause exclusively uses the
term “special” in reference to the sub-category of least developing countries, particularly so,




financial and trade needs”. On the other hand, the authors report that the notion of
“differential” and “more favourable” treatment is used in reference to a broader category of
“developing country” (Paugam and Novel, 2005, p. 4). Thus, it can be reasonably deduced
that the Enabling Clause accords differential treatment to only developing countries,
including the sub-set of LDCs as distinct from treatment which is generally available to all
WTO members. Given some peculiar features, circumstances or needs of some countries
within the category of developing countries, i.e. LDCs, the Enabling Clause allows for
further differentiation to offer “special treatment” to this sub-category of developing
countries in response to their peculiar features, circumstances or needs [21]. “Special”, is
used to distinguish the treatment available exclusively for LDCs from the treatment that is
generally available to the broader group of developing countries qualifying for SDT
(Rolland, 2012, p. 80). Thus, the specific features, circumstances or needs of LDCs, are the
basis for according them special treatment and not simply the basis that they are developing
countries. If at all, the latter only prequalifies them.
Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause clearly affirms the intention of WTO members to
treat developing countries differently when it comes to holding them to their trade
obligations. Such is to be directly linked with a demonstrable and improving capacity of
these countries to participate in international trade. Paragraph 9 of the Clause further
underscores the principle of graduation by which developing countries are expected to take
up reciprocal trade commitments as their capacities improve. It reflects the idea of
graduating developing countries from SDT based on some objective criteria. In other words,
it allows for differential treatment of developing countries on the basis of such objective
criteria. This is without prejudice to the fact that the Enabling Clause defined no such
objective criteria.
4. Approaches to differentiation and proposals for reform
The ability to develop countries to implement and benefit from the implementation of WTO
rules and disciplines varies, depending on factors such as their institutional capacity,
income, size and level of development. This underscores the need for differentiation between
countries to appropriately determine which rules should apply to which countries at any
point in time. This raises the following questions: – which developing countries can benefit
from implementing a specific rule such that the benefits exceed implementation costs?
Which country requires SDT before it is able to implement such rules? The rationale for
these questions is that some developing countries do not have the capacity to implement the
rules even if these were beneficial. They would require some support to be able to implement
the rules and reap associated benefits. Differentiation, thus, becomes important to sort
developing countries effectively to achieve development. The WTO specifically recognises
and differentiates between developing countries. Indeed, efforts to differentiate between
developing countries for the purpose of determining SDT eligibility are consistent with the
letter and spirit of WTO law [22]. It remains, however, that “objective criteria”, which should
serve as the basis for such differentiation across WTO agreements are yet to be clearly
articulated. This section reviews existing approaches to differentiation and suggests reform
of the current SDT framework [23].
4.1 Country-based approach
Country-based approaches tend to group countries at a similar development level and
context for the purpose of SDT application. The grouping could either be based on
geographical or socio-economic criteria. The rationale for the geographical approach is that





regional grouping. For instance, the development situation and trade needs of Sub-Saharan
countries such as the Gambia, South Africa and Kenya, depicts huge variance that would
require differential treatment to achieve the objective of SDT in the WTO. Albeit, we earlier
questioned the propriety of using socioeconomic indicators to categorise countries at the
WTO, using them to determine countries’ eligibility for SDT holds huge prospects for
successfully reforming SDT in theWTO.
Hoekman et al., 2004 and Paugam and Novel, 2005 suggest what is a hybrid (of the
country-based approach and a rules-based approach) which identifies an “LDCþ” group
that would be required to comply with the “core” WTO principles of non-discrimination,
prohibition of quantitative restrictions, tariffs binding and transparency. They argue that
some WTO disciplines may generate significant implementation costs and prove unsuited
to particular developing countries’ circumstances, especially for low-income countries
(Paugam and Novel, 2005, p. 14). Thus, it is important to ensure that countries have the scale
needed for benefits to exceed implementation costs before implementing a rule in issue. This
approach would require redefining the existing three-fold country classification at theWTO.
Hoekman et al., 2004 suggest that stricter economic-based criteria would be required to
regroup countries along the lines of income levels and institutional capacities such that only
low-income and small economies should qualify for SDT (Hoekman et al., 2004, p. 494).
4.2 Rules-based approach
The rules-based approach aims to define objective criteria for SDT eligibility on an
agreement-by-agreement basis (Paugam and Novel, 2005, p. 12). Stevens (2002) suggests
that such an approach is based on the premise that eligible countries must share a set of
differences that are directly related to the rules for which SDT is proposed. Hoekman et al.
(2003) propose that the rules-based approach involves country-based criteria that are
applied on an agreement-by-agreement basis to determine whether (when) agreements
should be implemented. Essentially, countries that exhibit similar “differences” in respect to
a particular rule for which SDT is required, must be accorded such SDT. However, whether
the same group of countries receives SDT in respect of another rule is an entirely
independent consideration.
4.3 “Differentiated differentiation” approach
While there is a lack of consensus on appropriate criteria for country categorisation at the
WTO [24], it is unarguable that more differentiation between countries is vital if SDT is to
become a useful tool to address the special concerns of developing countries [25]. This paper
advocates defining the eligibility criteria for allowing countries access to the SDT on an
agreement-by-agreement basis [26]. While this may attract academic critique, the rationale
for this approach is based on the fact that SDT should be geared towards supporting
countries to improve their rule implementation capacities. Under this approach, graduation
from SDT is not horizontal, given that a country may graduate from SDT for a particular
WTO agreement, but may remain eligible for SDT under another agreement.
The suggestion that “particular concerns” “should be taken into consideration, as
appropriate, in the course of the Agriculture and NAMA negotiations” is an indication that
special attention could be given to the concerns of developing countries (including capacity
constraints) as they undertake increasing WTO rule obligations [27]. The WTO, thus,
already permits differentiated SDT according to a country’s level of development. This
could be extended across all agreements. The success of the proposed endeavour, however,




than an across-the-board approach (Hoekman et al., 2003; Keck and Low, 2004; and Stevens,
2002).
While acknowledging that additional resources and efforts would be required to apply
this differentiated approach, the advantage of ensuring that SDT responds to specific [trade-
related] needs of countries, particularly, as attention is given to the economic costs and
benefits of implementation of WTO rules makes it worth the while (Hoekman et al., 2004).
The downside to this approach lies mainly in the fact that it requires regular implementation
audits, which may likely boil down to an assessment of each beneficiary country’s
implementation of each relevant agreement. Furthermore, the complexities involved in
defining objective criteria and the basis for differentiation is another tricky area. Besides,
there is no guarantee that the results of implementation audits, i.e. the costs and benefits of
implementation, will be acceptable to all WTO members. Finally, the volatility and multi-
stakeholder process that may be required to determine objective criteria acceptable to all
WTO members may not only make negotiations more complex but also expose the WTO
system to cross-conditionality arising from other international development/financial
institutions (Hoekman et al., 2004).
Despite the challenges listed above, the proposed framework is consistent as it provides a
transparent analytical approach for a reformed SDT framework, particularly in terms of
measuring the economic development needs against the legal provisions. It is most
consistent with the “one size does not fit all” approach and ensures that only those countries
that justifiably need SDT the most, get it.
4.4 Implementation proposal for differentiated differentiation
“Differentiated differentiation” as an implicit threshold approach to differentiation is
amenable to the principle of graduation which identifies which countries should be allowed
derogation from a particular WTO rule at any given time (Cottier, 2006; Gonzalez et al.,
2011a). The rationale for “differentiated differentiation” is that SDT should be geared
towards supporting countries to improve their rule implementation capacities rather than
provide them with a permanent exemption. Accordingly, the assumption of trade treaty
obligations by developing countries should be determined their rule implementation
capacity at any given time. To operationalise such modulation of commitments, firstly,
determine what constraints developing countries are likely to face in implementing a
particular rule [28]. Secondly, identify, based on some analytical criteria, the countries that
suffer from these constraints, and hence, lack the capacity to implement the rule. Targeted
SDT, including derogation from discipline, could then be offered to such countries to
overcome the constraint(s). The objective here is to ensure that SDT is targeted at only those
countries that justifiably need it the most. This approach requires that rule implementation
is made contingent on a country overcoming a set of identified constraints. That is, the
modulation of commitments only kicks in when identified constraints have been overcome.
Impliedly, countries that fall below a preferred threshold would be entitled to SDT while
those above the threshold would not be eligible for SDT. Adopting a new evidence-based,
case-by-case approach to SDT could ensure both that the concerns of the poorest countries
are addressed and that advanced developing countries carry their weight in the
organisation.
To operationalise a threshold approach to derogation from legal discipline, the use of
analytical criteria to identify constraints that countries face as a result of or in the process of
rule implementation is central. Gonzalez et al. (2011a, p. 17) note the possibility of a
mismatch between the analytical criteria used and actual constraints identified. This





constraint. Nonetheless, identifying and using a combined set of indicators to identify
possible constraints could be less problematic. A composite indicator will better reflect such
constraints vis-à-vis the varied needs of countries.
4.5 Designing a composite indicator approach
A composite indicator approach is proposed to combine indicators into a composite
measure. The composite indicator encapsulates individual indicators, each of which has
been pre-ranked according to a weighted structure. In practical terms, this requires firstly,
identifying the constraints and proposing appropriate indicators (with weights attached to
each) to capture these constraints. Secondly, ranking countries by indicators. Third, taking
the average ranking unit (mean) and applying the sets of weights to create a composite
indicator. The weights should be an outcome of a negotiated process that takes countries’
performance of global trade into consideration. Fourth, determine the relative standing of
countries in terms of constraints faced, by the average ranking score of each constraint in
relation to the corresponding indicator. This will allow the WTO to draw up a list of
developing countries that reflects their heterogeneous needs.
Determining the threshold for graduating countries (on the list of countries) for
derogation from a particular discipline is important. In this regard, finding the variance of
the average ranking score for each country per indicator of a constraint is required. The
second is determining the standard deviation from the weighted mean of the composite
indicator. Selecting the value of the standard deviation as our threshold can objectively
determine which countries should be allowed derogation from rule implementation and
which countries should not be allowed such flexibility. Specifically, only countries that fall
below the selected threshold should be allowed such derogation.
4.6 Procedural reform: a case for improved monitoring of technical assistance delivery
The question with differentiated differentiation approach remains whether special
provisions, for example, that, allow a longer transition period for developing countries to
apply international trade obligations could become more effective? Differentiated
differentiation will require successful implementation of the WTO agreements and
rationalisation of institutional and human resources, policy adaptation and improved
coordination with relevant stakeholders to facilitate their participation at the WTO (Prowse,
2002). In practical terms, this would require setting up a multi-stakeholder structure to
coordinate the implementation of such agreements; developing agreement-specific strategies
and action plans to achieve the goals of each agreement; and putting an appropriate
regulatory and legislative framework in place to support reforms aimed at achieving the
objective of any particular agreement. For several developing countries and LDCs, the
financial and technical resources to initiate and sustain such broad reform are lacking.
Technical assistance provisions through the WTO obligate developed countries and the
Secretariat to provide technical assistance to help developing countries take full advantage
of the multilateral trading system [29]. However, the vagueness of such provisions (in terms
of form and purpose) and the non-binding nature of the obligations have generated concerns
about their operability.
China’s successful compliance with Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) reduction target
under the Montreal protocol [30] offers some insight into how countries could leverage
targeted assistance during transition periods, in particular, to comply with their trade
obligations [31]. China’s case suggests that financial or technical assistance must be linked
to a country’s compliance with the procedural requirements of an agreement and continuous




that agreement is concerned. For instance, this could see a developing country receive
financial or technical assistance to review its local laws towards complying with its WTO
obligations, provided it prior complies with its national/constitutional requirements to adopt
WTO agreements [32].
4.7 Monitoring and review
To further ensure SDT accountability and effectiveness, a mechanism to monitor and report
progress on rule implementation during a transition period could prove invaluable. The July
2004 Package [33] refers to “monitoring and surveillance” in the context of agriculture and
suggests only “enhancing” the existing system of notifications [34]. However, the fact that
the significant contributions of SDT provisions are spread more across specific WTO
agreements than in the general provisions, suggests that integrating any monitoring
mechanism(s) into substantive agreements may be a most effective approach. Underscoring
the importance of reporting requirements in promoting accountability and effectiveness of
treaty obligations, Rolland, 2012 summarises that it could be useful to monitor and improve
compliance with obligations; gather the information that may be used for reforming a
particular rule or agreement; and, assist in the design and delivery of effective capacity-
building support to deserving beneficiaries (Rolland, 2012, p. 128). Such a mechanism will be
useful in providing early warning signals if a developing country is not on course to meet
the SDT objective. Any problem can be timely identified. If such a developing country
requires on-going assistance to be redirected or modified, that is done in time to address the
problem. This approach will incentivise developing countries to draw motivation from
knowing that continuous technical assistance is linked to meeting certain thresholds in their
progress towards complying with trade treaty obligations. A mandatory requirement for all
SDT beneficiaries to self-report progress as part of a peer review process should also be put
in place for the beneficiaries of technical assistance.
5. Conclusion and the way forward
Globalisation has altered the pattern of world trade and a few developing countries have
progressed from being traditional goods exporters to becoming partners in preferential
trade agreements. While the changing pattern of trade has favoured several countries, it has
been criticised as limiting the economic freedom of developing countries, in that it prevents
them from accessing markets in the rest of the world to support their varied development
needs (Verter, 2017). Sen (1999) opined that a major failing of the current SDT approach has
been its usage as the basis for exempting developing countries from WTO obligations
instead of helping these countries comply with WTO obligations to support full integration
into the global trading system. There is ample evidence to suggest that the gains from SDT
have been limited and benefits are not being harnessed by developing countries and LDCs,
hence, the need to rethink the current SDT framework at theWTO. SDT revision has been in
the limelight lately at the WTO with the US’ proposal for a strict definition of a “developing
country” by WTO rules [35], the EU’s proposal for asymmetry in rule obligations amongst
developing countries [36], Norway’s call for a “constructive conversation [. . .] about the
development dimension”[37], and Canada’s call for a balance between reciprocity and
flexibility andmore differentiation between developing countries [38].
At present, SDT in the WTO is undefined and self-declared. As the debate on SDT has
revealed, there is a lack of agreement on what SDT should entail, where it is appropriate and
what its purpose should be in the multilateral trading system. Our paper argues that the
WTO’s approach to SDT must be framed through the lens of “what development means”. It





help determine the level and type of SDT required to help it achieve sustainable
development. We advocate “differentiated differentiation” for the application of SDT and
also make a case for defining SDT eligibility criteria on an agreement-by-agreement basis.
“Differentiated differentiation” envisages that SDT is geared towards supporting countries
to improve their rule implementation capacity rather than provide them with a permanent
exemption. Hence, whether a developing country is allowed to derogate from a particular
rule is dependent on its capacity to implement the rule at a given time. In practical terms, we
would first need to determine what constraints developing countries are likely to face in
implementing that particular rule. Secondly, we would have to identify, based on some
analytical criteria, the countries that suffer from these constraints, and hence, lack the
capacity to implement the rule. To ensure that selected analytical criteria sufficiently reflect
the heterogeneity of possible constraints, we propose a combined set of indicators that will
serve to identify such constraints. Targeted SDT, including derogation from discipline,
could then be offered to the deserving country to overcome the identified constraint(s). This
approach not only puts an end to the long-drawn debate on country re-categorisation in the
WTO but also ensures that only those countries that justifiably need SDT themost get it.
To avoid a situation where the SDT framework as proposed, is used as an eternal crutch,
the paper advocates for graduating SDT beneficiaries based on a threshold determined by
the value of the standard deviation from the weighted mean of the composite indicator.
Selecting the value of the standard deviation as our threshold can objectively determine
which countries should be allowed derogation from rule implementation and which
countries should not be allowed such flexibility. Specifically, only countries that fall below
the selected threshold should be allowed such derogation.
Developing countries need to visualise SDT for what it is – a trade tool to promote
development. To ensure that SDT advances the development and does not impede it, a
broader understanding of the meaning of development must be taken and reflected in the
design of an alternative approach to SDT. Consistent with a more comprehensive goal of
sustainable development as expressed in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, development
should be viewed as an empowering process for individual humans/countries (Bacchus and
Manak, 2020; Bacchus, 2004). It is this view that should be the guiding light for efforts to
promote development at the WTO. This more expansive view contemplates that trade is a
pathway to engaging with the challenges and opportunities of the wider world. Thus, trade
becomes a means to promote the broadest fulfilment of both individual and national potential
(Bacchus andManak, 2020). This broader view of what development means must be reflected
in SDT design at the WTO. The focus of SDT should, thus, not be on more exclusion but
more inclusion. SDT “should enable rather than exempt” (Low et al., 2019).
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